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ABSTRACT: In this study, we document regulator reputation effects in a developing country. We 
construct a panel on 3,432 major toxic polluters from 2004 to 2015 using detailed plant-specific 
data on pollution, inspections, and fines. Results show that: regulators target polluters based on 
past violations; fines induce more accurate self-reporting and result in higher self-reported 
pollution at the sanctioned facility; increased fines on other polluters lead to long-term 
improvements in environmental performance and reductions in toxic pollution. An increase in 
amount fined by 1% on all others in the same municipality leads to an individual plant reducing 
its annual pollution discharges by 0.1% for all seven toxics examined. These findings are 
significant as toxic pollutants are harmful even at small concentrations. We highlight synergies in 
costs of monitoring and enforcement of mandatory reporting regulation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cost effective environmental regulation is relevant for developing countries, where 
budgets for environmental protection are typically small. One particular concern is monitoring and 
enforcement. On the one hand, any regulation of environmental pollution such as air, water 
(surface and groundwater), and land cannot be effective without appropriate monitoring and 
enforcement of these regulations. On the other hand, monitoring and enforcement actions are 
costly. Evidence suggests a significant portion of the costs of implementing environmental laws 
arises from the costs incurred by the regulatory agencies from inspections, enforcement actions, 
and judicial actions on polluters found in non-compliance (Gray and Shimshack 2011). 
In this paper, we study the impact of monitoring and enforcement activities on the behavior 
of major toxic polluters in Mexico. One of the main contributions of this paper is that we find 
evidence that regulatory pressure channels that exist in developed countries also operate in 
developing country settings. We find that despite only a few fines imposed on individual polluters, 
there exists a significant deterrence impact on toxic pollutant discharges due to regulator reputation 
effects (Shimshack and Ward 2005). Policymakers need to consider these spill-over effects as it 
implies significant cost-efficiency of these rarely imposed monetary fines. 
To explore our questions, we create a comprehensive panel data on 3,432 major toxics 
generating facilities from 2004 to 2015 by matching annual pollution reports on seven toxics with 
the inspections and fines data of the federal regulatory agency. We estimate panel data models for 
inspections, fines, fined amounts, and toxic pollution levels. To address idiosyncratic targeting, 
we include regulatory activities under other (non-toxic) programs as higher toxic water pollution 
discharge of the plant may not influence monitoring and enforcement actions under other 
inspection programs. The only other study that looks at determinants of monitoring and fines is 
2 
Escobar and Chavez (2013) for conventional air emissions in Mexico City. However, they do not 
consider actual emissions reported by major polluters. Past evidence on voluntary environmental 
initiatives is that environmental certificates are limited to short-term improvements in 
environmental performance. Hence, the effectiveness of regulatory activities like inspections and 
enforcement actions such as monetary fines remains an open question. 
We find three main results. First, we find evidence that inspections and fines decisions are 
consistent with the compliance history of the individual facility. Results show that if a plant has 
one more violation under the toxic program in the past, the probability that it receives an inspection 
visit increases by around one percentage point for all seven toxics. We find that if a plant has one 
more violation under all other programs in the past, the probability that it receives an inspection 
visit increases by 1-2 percentage points for all seven toxics. One more inspection visit on others in 
the past results in a higher probability of being inspected by 0.1 percentage points for all seven 
toxics. Past violations for toxic inspections raise the probability of monetary fines by 3-4 
percentage points and the amount fined by 1%. We find that one more inspection visit on others 
in the past on all other facilities in the same municipality results in a higher probability of being 
fined by less than 0.1 percentage point (statistically significant for all seven toxics). Higher toxic 
inspections on others in the same municipality leads to a higher fined amount by 0.1%. 
Second, we show that regulator fines on others in the same jurisdiction leads polluters to 
reduce their plant’s toxic pollutant discharges.2 For the pollution models, we find strong evidence 
on general regulator reputation effects. Results show that a 1% increase in amount fined on other 
facilities in the same municipality results in decline in annual cadmium, chromium, cyanide, and 
lead discharges by 0.05-0.10%. For the remaining three toxic pollutants (arsenic, mercury, and 
2 Blackman (2012) show that plants that faced fines were more likely to adopt voluntary environmental management 
practices to avoid the burden of inspections and sanctions of regulators.   
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nickel), the coefficient on lagged fined amount on others is consistently negative but not always 
significant at conventional levels (0.01-0.06%). Magnitudes are small, but toxic substances are 
damaging even at tiny concentrations (CEC, 2018). The other noteworthy finding in the pollution 
models is that one more priority violation under the toxic program leads to an increase in annual 
cadmium, cyanide, and nickel discharges by around 0.2%. Results show that one more priority 
violation under other programs also leads plants to increase annual cadmium, chromium, cyanide, 
lead, and nickel discharges by 0.4-0.6%. This result is not surprising as plants are likely to be 
inspected under toxic and other programs simultaneously. 
Third, we find that despite concerns of widespread regulatory capture, a status of 
significant non-compliance for the plant itself increases pollution levels reported. We infer that 
regulatory pressure directed at individual polluters are effective in improving pollution reporting 
and measurement protocols. Put differently, we provide novel evidence that formal regulatory 
actions such as inspections and fines imposed are on polluters with recent violations. We find that 
significant non-compliance results in plants updating their pollution reports improving the 
accuracy of pollution records. We find strong evidence that higher fines on facilities in the same 
municipality result in a general deterrence impact. We infer that in the absence of enforceable 
limits on plant-specific pollution reporting, concern for a bad public image due to considerable 
media attention when fined provides the incentive to reduce pollution levels.3 Saha and Mohr 
 
3 Perla, M. (2018, February 18), Profepa multa a KIA Motors por más de 7 mill de pesos, El Universal. Retrieved 
from: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/sociedad/profepa-multa-kia-motors-por-mas-de-7-millones-de-pesos; 
Montoya, JR. (2018, November 14), Multa Profepa con 3.7 milliones pesos a  termoeléctrica de CFE, La Jornada. 
Retrieved from: https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/2018/11/14/impone-profepa-multa-de-3-7-millones-de-pesos-
a-termoelectrica-de-cfe-1641.html; PROFEPA realiza multas en Tabasco por casi 30 millones de pesos (2018, 
December 4), La Verdad. Retrieved from: https://laverdadnoticias.com/ecologia/PROFEPA-realiza-multas-en-
Tabasco-por-casi-30-millones-de-pesos-20181204-0143.html. 
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(2013) find that media attention has a deterring effect on pollution from toxics releasing facilities 
in the U.S. 
2. BACKGROUND MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT 
Monitoring and enforcement actions can be quite time-consuming and costly procedures 
for both developed and developing countries. Environmental inspections range from low-intensity 
activities such as visual confirmation of abatement equipment to maintenance, sampling, and 
reporting procedures and even sampling emissions at the plant. Subsequently, enforcement actions 
depend on the severity of the violation and compliance history of the facility. Usually, they begin 
with administrative orders and might end in financial penalties and closure of the operation, 
following civil and criminal litigations. Regulators target polluters based on local marginal benefits 
and costs of monitoring and enforcement on those that are in non-compliance (Helland, 1998; Gray 
and Shadbegian, 2004). Inspectors target bigger, more polluting plants and plants belonging to the 
high human health risk and environmental impacts, such as chemical manufacturing. Regulators 
also target frequent violators that have a previous history of non-compliance (Shimshack 2014).  
Regulatory interventions such as inspections and enforcement activities improve 
environmental performance in developed countries such as the U.S. For deterrence, both specific 
actions against the individual polluter as well as general regulatory actions against all other plants 
under the same legal jurisdiction improve compliance by reducing violations (Shimshack and 
Ward 2005) or improve over-compliance (Shimshack and Ward 2008). Shimshack and Ward 
(2005) highlight the mechanism that plants update their beliefs by observing regulatory actions 
like increased sanctions on all other plants in the same regulatory jurisdiction in the U.S. The 
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authors also mention that the expected fines on the plant might underestimate the true economic 
costs of sanctions due to bad publicity or degraded reputation with the regulators.4  
Recent evidence from large emerging economies suggests that weak institutions and 
limited budget result in environmental regulatory actions that are, to some extent, limited. Gupta 
et al. (2019) find evidence that large air and water-polluting plants in one state in India improved 
compliance when faced with more inspections and violation notices. Regulators targeted plants 
based on their compliance history and dirty industries but implement less stringent enforcement 
actions if they were more profitable or listed in stock exchange markets. Similarly, China’s 
pollution levy system shows that inspections verify plants’ self-reported pollution but does not 
improve performance by reducing their pollution (Lin, 2013).  
In Latin America, Caffera and Lagomarsino (2014) find that polluters adjust conventional 
water pollution discharges upwards in the presence of municipal inspectors in Uruguay. Regarding 
deterrence, they report the limited effectiveness of specific deterrence in contrast to general 
deterrence measures such as increased plant closures. Fines on others that are less visible events 
did not have significant general deterrence impacts. In Colombia, Briceno and Chavez (2010) find 
that enforcement and control actions (like sampling inspections) taken by the local corporation of 
Corpochivor leads to lower self-reported levels of conventional water pollutants. However, 
enforcement and monitoring activities do not influence the final payment of the discharge fees.  
Industrial pollution regulation in Mexico is still at its nascent stage. It implemented a two-
fold approach; first, through command-and-control regulations based on mandatory reporting 
thresholds, and second through voluntary initiatives by manufacturers that invest in pollution 
abatement to comply with third-party environmental audits (Blackman, 2010). The focus of the 
 
4 For a comprehensive review of the environmental deterrence literature focused on the US, see Gray and Shimshack 
(2011).   
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environmental law in Mexico is to ascertain that plants that are major polluters of toxic substances 
into the water regularly sample and measure emissions annually. Inspection visits to check on its 
emissions sampling and measurement records and imposing fines on those that failed to adhere to 
pollution measurement protocols are the mechanisms to promote regular measurement and 
reporting of pollution emissions. There are no limits on how much each plant can pollute. On the 
other hand, reporting abnormally high emissions compared to the entire industry or sector or even 
national scale results in these reports flagged as inconsistent and separated from the main 
emissions registry (personal communication, SEMARNAT, 2015). 
Escobar and Chavez (2013) show that larger industries in Mexico City that are more 
polluting under the air emissions program face greater regulatory efforts. However, their analysis 
does not consider plant-specific pollution levels at all. Using a small sample of 34 manufacturing 
facilities under federal jurisdiction and inspections visits during 2011, Camacho (2016) reports 
that inspectors target larger plants (captured by the value of production), plants with higher 
environmental impacts, and high-risk sectors, e.g., the petrochemicals, chemicals, and metals 
processing.  
There is no prior evidence on the impact of monitoring and enforcement in improving the 
environmental performance of major polluters or in increasing the accuracy of self-reported 
pollution emissions. Dasgupta et al. (2000) use survey data from 1995 from 236 major facilities 
in Mexico to provide one of the first evidence on self-assessed environmental compliance. 
Blackman et al. (2010) find that voluntary mechanisms such as obtaining Clean Industry 
Certificates have limited effectiveness in improving long-term environmental compliance. The 
authors point out that plants seek out audits to get these environmental certificates primarily to 
access the synergies of two years’ inspection relief and a reputation of environmental stewards in 
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Mexican manufacturing. We interpret this evidence as polluters in Mexico largely operating 
under cost-minimizing principles and evidence of the burden of fines imposed (even though they 
are contestable in a court of law). 
Community characteristics are significant determinants of compliance behavior for major 
polluters, even in developed country settings (Earnhart, 2004). On the other hand, community 
characteristics are generally not significant determinants of inspections and enforcement actions 
(Shimshack and Ward, 2005). Gray and Shadbegian (2004) include the environmental preferences 
of state-level constituents in the inspections and enforcement models and plant-level pollution 
models. In Santiago (Chile), Palacios and Chavez (2005) find that areas with higher population 
density have a lower probability of compliance, while areas with higher income witness higher 
compliance. Escobar and Chavez (2013) find greater inspection efforts in poorer and denser 
municipalities in Mexico. Recent evidence on plants polluting more in more marginalized 
communities across Mexico comes from Chakraborti and Shimshack (2020). The authors use 
detailed socioeconomic data to show that plant-level pollution increases by 15-40% as 1-kilometer 
areas surrounding each plant become more marginalized. For our present purposes, we utilize 
aggregate municipality level census data in the regulatory actions and pollution reporting models. 
3. DATA 
We obtain inspections and fines data for all industries and businesses in Mexico from 2000 
onwards. To include variables on formal regulatory actions, such as inspections and fines, we 
had to manually match the plants in the annual inspections and fines database with the plants in 
the annual pollution database. Based on industry names, addresses, and other locational 
information, about a third of our plants with pollution reports faced any formal inspections and 
fines activities over the entire period. Hence, we assume that toxics reporting plants not 
8 
 
appearing in the inspections and fines database did not face any inspections and fines by the 
regulators.5  
3A. PROFEPA data 
In June of 2004, Mexico adopted mandatory reporting of major toxics releasing plants under 
federal jurisdiction and discharging into the nation’s waters. Major polluters are those that 
discharge more than a certain level of toxic pollutants. PROFEPA (Procuraduría Federal de 
Protección al Ambiente) is the agency responsible for inspections of all major facilities subject to 
Mexico's General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (Ley General de 
Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección al Ambiente, LGEEPA). Regulatory capacity is weak due to a 
lack of coordination between semiautonomous agencies like the PROFEPA and the Ministry of 
the Environment (SEMARNAT) (Challenger et al., 2018).  
Unlike the monitoring protocol of environmental protection agencies in developed 
countries, inspection and enforcement in Mexico have a much more limited role. Rather than 
taking samples of actual emissions, inspections are “limited to surveillance of the aspects that are 
regulated [Alvarez-Larrauri and Fogel (2008), page 5]”. Inspectors check the documentation on 
permits (whether they are current and payments made) and measurement records going back up to 
three years (whether samples were sent to accredited labs for measurement and recorded). State 
regulators conduct monitoring and enforcement activities under federal oversight and supervision 
(PROFEPA, 2016).  
Inspection protocols for manufacturing facilities fall under six programs, e.g., high-risk 
activities, toxic waste management, environmental impact, land, air (fixed sources), and water 
 
5 In robustness checks, we estimate all the models, inspections, fines, amount fined, and pollution, including only the 
plants that appeared in both databases i.e. reported toxic discharges and faced regulatory actions at least once, over 
2004 to 2015. Results are consistent in sign but much noisily estimated in the regulatory actions models. 
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pollution. Each plant is subject to specific regulations, depending on its activity. During the visit 
to the plant, the inspector checks the plant's records that support its compliance with all the 
environmental norms that apply. For water and other polluting activities, inspectors usually verify 
that an accredited lab has measured the discharges and permits are valid. For air emissions, 
inspectors also engage in visual inspection of equipment and perhaps operation (PROFEPA, 2013). 
The outcome of the visit can be either no irregularities, minor irregularities, urgent measures to 
take, priority attention, or temporary (partial or total) closure of operation. For the empirical 
models, we define significant non-compliance status as any of the last three outcomes mentioned 
above. The various actions under final resolution are the closure of administrative records with no 
measures required, agreement to undertake measures to get back into compliance, and sanctions.  
Regulators focus on all polluters under federal jurisdiction, specifically, plants based on 
environmental impacts, prior record of compliance with the environmental legislation, and toxic 
residuals. Typically, inspectors target major polluters for annual visits, but a facility may be visited 
more than once in the same year. Initial visits can be due to regular monitoring or due to emergency 
or citizen complaints. Initial visits are followed by verification visits, after the completion of which 
firms are obligated by law to take measures to get back into compliance or sanctions in the form 
of fines are imposed as a resolution to administrative actions of enforcement. Camacho (2016) 
finds that verification visits are for priority violations as outcomes from the first or initial visit. 
We obtained detailed data on plant name, address, type of facility, inspections program, 
type of inspection, the outcome of the visit, final resolution, and fines imposed through a 
Transparency request. We examine inspections and fines data from 2000 to 2016. Toxic waste or 
residuals program registered the most inspection activities, with 51% of the visits between 2000 
and 2016. High-risk activities comprised 10% of all visits, land contamination and air emissions 
10 
 
9% each, biological residuals (8%), and environmental impact (5%) were the other major industrial 
inspections programs.  
On average, PROFEPA conducted about 7000 annual visits. 57% were regular monitoring, 
the remaining initial visits were 7% citizen complaints, and 4% emergencies; 32% were follow up 
verification visits.6 Of the total inspection visits, on average, plants got fined about 30% of the 
time every year. From the data, plants can be fined more than once within a year for violations 
under different inspections programs, and the amount fined might be identical under all programs. 
The fines data exhibit extreme skewness; only a few manufacturers faced significant penalties.  
3B. RETC data 
The self-reported pollution database on toxic pollution called the Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registry (Registro de Emisiones y Transferencias de Contaminantes, RETC) is available from the 
ministry of environment of Mexico (Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, or 
SEMARNAT). The database is updated annually with a couple of years lag. It contains information 
on all polluters that are under federal jurisdiction and pollute into national waters. Based on the 
frequency of different pollutants and media reported, we focus on seven toxic materials discharged 
in the water. It covers eleven industrial sectors that are major toxic polluters, defined as plants 
discharging 1 kilogram of arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, and nickel, annually (and 
more than 100 kilograms of cyanide).  
Since mandatory reporting began, the sample of plants reporting positive amounts of toxic 
pollution varied remarkably from one year to the next.7 We access the database in 2017, with data 
until 2015. We include direct discharges and indirect discharges through sewage as it enters water 
 
6 Majority of the inspection visits were categorized as minor irregularities (51.5%) followed by 36% in the no 
irregularities category, and the remaining 12.5% under either one of the urgent or priority actions. 
7 We present a Missing Pollution Reports Appendix to investigate patterns in the missing pollution data. 
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bodies without treatment or recycling (CEC, 2011). On average, the number of plants reporting 
water pollution for at least one of the seven toxic pollutants was around 1000 facilities per year. 
However, the panel was unbalanced, exhibiting considerable variation over the years covered. The 
number of facilities reporting peaked at 1,388 facilities with water pollution reports in 2006.  
We undertook manual consolidation of the annual databases to create a facility level panel. 
Each physical plant or business that changed names, ownership, even sector was assigned a new 
identifier in the RETC database. The physical location of each plant had to be verified using geo-
location tools. Most of these polluters belonged to the chemicals industry (close to 30% of the 
reports), followed by metal processing (13%) and automotive sectors. As expected, these plants 
are located mostly near large urban areas. The top five states were the State of Mexico (18%), 
Tamaulipas (10%), Mexico City and Nuevo Leon (9%), and Jalisco (8%). 
3C. Sociodemographic data 
The socioeconomic, demographic variables are from two censuses and one conteo year (2000, 
2010, and 2005) that are relevant for pollution from 2004 to 2015. We choose eleven census 
variables to incorporate indicators of education, health, and housing conditions (see Table 1). We 
also include population density as a control for the population exposed to local pollution. We 
assign municipality level socio-economic data to each plant. We include lagged rather than 
contemporaneous values on socioeconomic features to avoid reverse causality of sorting in 
response to local conditions such as pollution (Chakraborti and Shimshack, 2020). We create three 
bins of four years of pollution to divide up the twelve years of data evenly.  
3D. Summary Statistics 
Our final sample is a panel of 3432 toxics releasing plants, over 2004-2015, on inspections at each 
plant under various monitoring programs, the outcome of the visit or degree of violation, initial or 
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follow-up visit, and the amount fined as the final resolution. To fulfill our empirical strategy, we 
present all descriptive statistics of regulatory actions based on toxics inspections programs and all 
other programs grouped as non-toxics.8 Table 1 presents the plant level summary statistics on 
regulatory actions for the toxic inspections program. On average, a plant got inspected 0.05 times 
annually. Overall, a plant got fined much less frequently than it got inspected. On average, a plant 
faced a financial penalty of 0.02 times a year. Of the positive fined amounts, on average, a plant 
faced fines of 183 USD in real terms, yearly.  
Table 1 also presents the relevant statistics for the other regulatory activities used in the 
estimations, namely lagged inspections, lagged fined counts, and lagged fined amounts, on itself 
and others in the same municipality. We consider two lag lengths of the past three years and the 
past two years as regulatory processes often spilled across years. For the past three years lag, a 
plant was inspected 0.14 times and fined 0.05 times with an average fine of $202 for positive fines. 
For the past two years lag, a plant was inspected 0.09 times and fined 0.04 times, with an average 
positive fine of $198.  For the past three years lag, the average number of inspections on all other 
plants in the same municipality was 10.80, the average number of fines was 4.96, and an average 
positive fined amount of $650. For the past two years lag, the average number of inspections on 
all other plants in the same municipality was 4.70, the average number of fines was 2.15, and an 
average positive fined amount of $520. 
The socioeconomic characteristics show considerable variability for the sample of plants 
in the regression. The average plant is in a community with a low share of population over 15 that 
is illiterate (5%), a low proportion of 6 to 14-year-olds that do not attend school (5%), a much 
higher share of over 15 with primary education incomplete (41%), a high share of population 
 
8 Further descriptive statistics and graphs are presented in the Data Appendix. 
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without health services (39%), a low share of households with mud floor (5.5%), a low share of 
households without septic connection (7%), a low share of households without piped water (8%), 
a low share of households without adequate drainage (8.6%), a much smaller share of households 
without electricity (3%), a much higher share of households without washing machine (33%), a 
modest share of households without refrigerator (18%), and average population density of 2,605 
people per square kilometer. Since our sample is from urban municipalities, the average population 
density is comparable to the population density of metropolitan areas. 
Last, we present the summary statistics of the seven toxic pollutants. We preprocess the 
data with 0.5% trimming (Chakraborti and Shimshack, 2020). In the raw data, the maximum value 
for each of the seven pollutants was 40 to 80 standard deviations larger than the mean. The bottom 
panel of Table 1 summarizes the average toxic water pollution discharges across facilities. The 
pollution data also shows considerable variability depending on the toxic substance considered. 
The number of observations varies across pollutants because not all facilities report emissions on 
each substance and for all the years. Among facilities reporting discharges and matched with 
socioeconomic and inspections and fines data, mean discharges of nickel, lead, chromium, 
cadmium, cyanide, arsenic, and mercury are 57, 39, 35, 14, 9.8, 4.5, and 1 kilogram per year. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max. 
INSPECTIONS, TOXICS     
Annual inspections on itself (#) 11,860 0.05 0.21 1.00 
Past 3 yr. inspections on itself (#) 11,860 0.14 0.41 3.00 
Past 3 yr. inspections on others (#) 11,860 10.80 29.90 172.00 
Past 2 yr. inspections on itself (#) 11,860 0.09 0.32 2.00 
Past 2 yr. inspections on others (#) 11,860 4.70 12.93 81.00 
FINES IMPOSED, TOXICS     
Annual fines on itself (#) 11,860 0.02 0.14 1.00 
Past 3 yr. fines on itself (#) 11,860 0.05 0.25 3.00 
Past 3 yr. fines on others (#) 11,860 4.96 14.28 81.00 
Past 2 yr. fines on itself (#) 11,860 0.04 0.20 2.00 
Past 2 yr. fines on others (#) 11,860 2.15 6.46 40.00 
AMOUNT FINED, TOXICS     
Annual fines on itself (2010 USD) 11,860 3.59 247.71 22789.46 
Annual fines on itself, given fines>0 233 182.50 1761.73 22789.46 
Past 3 yr. fines on itself (2010 USD) 11,860 9.50 391.52 22789.46 
Past 3 yr. fines on itself, given fines>0 558 201.84 1795.74 22789.46 
Past 3 yr. fines on others (2010 USD) 11,860 257.80 2204.32 23236.48 
Past 3 yr. fines on others, given fines>0 4,702 650.26 3464.45 23236.48 
Past 2 yr. fines on itself (2010 USD) 11,860 7.08 330.75 22789.46 
Past 2 yr. fines on itself, given fines>0 424 197.90 1740.41 22789.46 
Past 2 yr. fines on others (2010 USD) 11,860 181.94 1838.97 23236.48 
Past 2 yr. fines on others, given fines>0 4,149 520.08 3080.99 23236.48 
     
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS     
Population over 15, illiterate (%) 11,860 5.02 3.53 45.94 
6 to 14-year-olds do not attend school (%) 11,860 4.85 2.14 22.02 
Over 15 primary education incomplete (%) 11,860 40.68 11.59 90.32 
Population without health services (%) 11,860 39.44 13.49 96.88 
Households with mudfloor (%) 11,860 5.46 6.27 79.86 
Households without septic connection (%) 11,860 7.17 6.56 78.77 
Households without piped water (%) 11,860 8.11 9.43 84.82 
Households without adequate drainage (%) 11,860 8.61 11.08 92.24 
Households without electricity (%) 11,860 3.28 4.06 71.54 
Households without washing machine (%) 11,860 32.72 15.43 99.05 
Households without refrigerator (%) 11,860 17.80 12.92 96.73 
Population Density, thousands/sq.km. 11,860 2.61 4.21 19.49 
     
POLLUTION (kg)     
Arsenic^ 8,681 4.49 36.61 972.12 
Cadmium 8,074 14.44 100.51 2197.09 
Chromium 8,312 35.04 258.27 5253.00 
Cyanide^ 8,684 9.81 69.90 1648.64 
Lead 9,037 39.25 279.98 5838.00 
Mercury^ 8,232 1.02 8.53 205.61 
Nickel 9,279 57.45 380.41 7586.50 
      NOTES: The summary statistics are for 3,432 facilities across Mexico. ^ denotes results do not    
      include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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 4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In this section, we test some hypotheses on environmental regulation in Mexico. Our conclusions 
derive from the results of the regulatory actions and self-reported pollution models. First, we 
empirically model the determinants of inspections and enforcement actions like fines implemented 
by the regulatory agency, PROFEPA. Second, we model the impacts of inspections and fines on 
annual reporting of seven toxic substances by major polluters in Mexico.  
We adopt two strategies to address the endogeneity of inspections and fines in the pollution 
model. Previous studies refer to the targeting of plants by inspectors based on the type of 
manufacturing or size of the operation. For example, a large chemical plant may report higher 
toxic pollution concurrently with higher inspections (or fines due to the higher environmental or 
health risks). Shimshack and Ward (2005) include instruments, i.e., regulatory actions that are 
correlated with inspections and fines directed at the specific plant but not correlated with the 
idiosyncratic targeting of the plant. Adopting this approach, we include inspections and fines under 
the toxics program targeted at all other plants in the same municipality as higher inspections (and 
fines) in the municipality is likely correlated with higher inspections (and fines) against the specific 
plant but not with higher pollution emissions of the plant.  
Second, we exploit the exogeneity of all other regulatory actions taken against an 
individual polluter that might not be influenced by the toxic discharges of the plant. To this extent, 
we consider inspections and fines imposed on each plant due to all programs other than the toxic-
residuals inspection program. We consider these regulatory actions as appropriate instruments as 
a chemical plant can face inspection visits under toxic residuals and high-risk or environmental 
impact monitoring programs simultaneously. However, higher toxic water pollution discharge of 
the plant may not influence regulatory activities under other programs.   
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4A. PROFEPA Inspections & Fines 
From PROFEPA guidelines, we know that inspectors typically target high risk, toxics generating 
industries, e.g., chemical industry and those with potential environmental (health) impacts on the 
population. However, we cannot include plant fixed effects in a probit estimation due to the 
incidental parameters problem. Our first strategy to control for targeting related to the 
manufacturing facility is to estimate the inspection (and fines) models for the seven toxic pollutants 
separately. Industrial facilities in the same sector often release a common set of toxic substances 
as residuals of their manufacturing process. However, this comes at the cost of efficiency loss as 
the sample size reduces significantly because not all plants in our sample report all seven pollutants 
each year.  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + Β𝑅𝑖𝑡′ + Γ𝑅−𝑖𝑡′ +ΦX𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          
(1) 
We estimate three separate models: annual inspections, annual fines, and annual fined 
amount. For the first estimation, the dependent variable, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡, is toxic inspections at plant 𝑖 and 
year 𝑡, a 0/1 binary variable. It takes a value of 1 if the plant is inspected under the toxics program 
during a year and 0 if the plant did not witness any toxic inspection visit in that same year. For the 
second estimation, the dependent variable 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a 0/1 binary outcome that takes the value one 
if plant 𝑖 receives a fine in year 𝑡 and zero if plant 𝑖 does not receive a fine in year 𝑡. For the third 
estimation, the dependent variable is the log of the monetary fine imposed on plant 𝑖 and year 𝑡 
with 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0. 
The inspection and fines variables are captured by 𝑅𝑖𝑡′, in equation (1). We control plant-
specific targeting by including lagged 𝑡′ = {𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 − 3} regulatory actions, such as the 
total number of inspections, total number of priority violations as the outcome of inspections, sum 
17 
 
of total fines imposed. 𝑅𝑖𝑡′ includes lagged inspections conducted at plant 𝑖, lagged priority 
violations as an outcome of the inspection visit at plant 𝑖, and log of lagged amount fined at plant 𝑖. We then sum over the past three and two years. Consequently, identification comes from time 
variation in plant-specific targeting. The regulatory actions for toxic inspections program and all 
other non-toxic inspections programs are separated. In our sample, 30% of the plants got inspected 
for toxics and non-toxic programs simultaneously. Of these, 30% got fined for both toxics and 
non-toxics in the same year. Of these, close to 50% got fined identical amounts under toxics and 
non-toxics during the same year. 
To control municipality level variations due to changes in budget or political situation, we 
include the total number of inspections and fines imposed on all other plants in the same 
municipality. Higher inspections (and enforcement actions if found in violation) targeted at all 
plants in the same jurisdiction might imply higher regulatory activities at the specific plant. In 
equation (1), 𝑅−𝑖𝑡′ includes lagged toxic inspections conducted on all other plants in the same 
municipality and log of lagged amount fined under the toxic program on all other plants in the 
same municipality. We then sum over the past three and two years in separate estimations. We 
focus on toxic inspections to capture general regulatory pressure to avoid multicollinearity 
problems as an increased budget increase all types of inspections. 
In equation (1) above, Χ𝑖𝑡 is the vector of twelve lagged socioeconomic, demographic 
variables including population density of the municipality of plant 𝑖, and drawn from the census 
years 2000, 2005, and 2010. We include year fixed effects to control all annual changes in 
regulatory activities that are not specific to the municipality.9 Finally, we cluster standard errors at 
the state level to control for arbitrary correlation across plants in the same state.  
 
9 We tried political cycles based on presidential and midterm elections and these coefficients were not significant 
either using turnout data at the municipality level. 
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First, we model annual visits by PROFEPA inspectors under the toxic-residuals inspection 
program at each plant in our sample.10 Panel A of Table 2 presents the inspection models for the 
past three years’ lagged values and Panel B for the past two years’ lagged values. The coefficients 
presented are the marginal effects calculated at mean values. In general, plants with a higher 
frequency of priority violations for both toxic and non-toxic programs faced a higher probability 
of being inspected. Results show that if a plant has one more violation under the toxic program in 
the past, the probability that it receives an inspection visit in the current year increases by around 
one percentage point for all seven toxics. If a plant has one more violation under the non-toxic 
program in the past, the probability that it receives an inspection visit in the current year increases 
by one to two percentage points for all seven toxics. We interpret this result as evidence of targeting 
by regulators based on significant non-compliance.  
In terms of general regulatory activities on all other facilities in the same municipality, the 
total number of past inspections on others is significant in determining current inspections. Results 
in Panel A and Panel B of Table 2 show that one more inspection visit on others in the past results 
in a higher probability of being inspected by 0.1 percentage points for all seven toxics. We interpret 
these results as higher inspections on all other polluters in the same municipality denotes greater 
regulatory resources in general, leading to an increase in the probability of inspections of 
individual plants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10In the Appendix Tables 2 through 5 we estimate two inspections model differentiated by type of inspection visits 
namely first or initial visit (regular protocol or emergency or citizen complaint) or follow-up verification visit. Initial 
visits as part of regular monitoring are further differentiated from initial visits due to citizen complaints and 
emergencies.   
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Table 2. Inspections Models 
Panel A: RE Probit Inspections, Marginal effects at mean values, regulatory actions lagged three years 
DEP.VAR: 
Toxic Inspections: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Toxic Violations 0.008* 0.010** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.009* 0.008** 0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.011** 0.013** 0.012** 0.013*** 0.011* 0.009* 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Toxic Inspections  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
on others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Toxic Fines 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.0010 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Toxic Fines  0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
on others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
Panel B: RE Probit Inspections, Marginal effects at mean values, regulatory actions lagged two years 
DEP.VAR: 
Toxic Inspections: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
 
Toxic Inspections 
 
0.014 
 
0.014 
 
0.015 
 
0.011 
 
0.011 
 
0.011 
 
0.011 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.002 -0.001 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Toxic Violations 0.011** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.014** 0.018** 0.012* 0.012** 0.014** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Toxic Inspections  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
on others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Toxic Fines 0.003 0.005** 0.005* 0.003 0.005** 0.003 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Toxic Fines  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 
on others (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury.  
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The socioeconomic variables are seldom significant, but we find some evidence of higher 
monitoring activities in more marginalized communities (also reported in Escobar and Chavez 
2013). Statistically significant coefficients on the proportion of the population between 6 and 14 
years old that do not attend school (for arsenic, cadmium, and nickel) and proportion of households 
without washing machine (for arsenic, cadmium, lead, mercury, and nickel) show that plants 
located in municipalities with higher shares face more inspection visits. Results are weaker for the 
past two years' lag length. 
 We present marginal effects calculated at mean values for the binary fined models in 
Table 3. Like the inspection models, past violations for toxic inspections raise the probability of 
current monetary fines imposed by 3-4 percentage points. Unlike the inspection results, past 
violations for non-toxic inspections are rarely statistically significant. We infer that enforcement 
actions depend on violations specific to the program. Regarding the general regulatory measures, 
like the inspection models, we find that one more inspection visit on others in the past, on all 
other facilities in the same municipality results in a higher probability of being fined by strictly 
less than 0.1 percentage point (statistically significant for all seven toxics). We interpret this 
result as increased financial resources of the regulatory agency resulting in increased inspections 
and increased discovery of potential violations and fines imposed.  
Like the inspection results, plants located in municipalities with higher shares of 
population six between 14 years that do not attend school or households without washing 
machine experience more fines imposed. However, a higher share of the population over 15 
years who are illiterate have the opposite sign (negative) than expected.  
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Table 3. Fined Models 
Panel A: RE Probit Fined, Marginal effects at mean values, regulatory actions lagged three years 
DEP.VAR:        
Toxic Fines: As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Toxic Violations 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.003 0.004 0.004* 0.004* 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Toxic Inspections  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
on others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Toxic Fines 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Toxic Fines  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
on others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
Panel B: RE Probit Fined, Marginal effects at mean values, regulatory actions lagged two years 
DEP.VAR:        
Toxic Fines: As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Non-toxic Insp. 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.002 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Toxic Violations 0.004 0.004 0.004* 0.004* 0.004 0.004 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Toxic Inspections  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
on others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Toxic Fines 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Toxic Fines  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
on others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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Table 4 presents the results of the amount fined models. We present estimation results upon 
fitting a Tobit model censored at zero fines. Like the binary fined models, past violations under 
the toxics program increase the fined amounts (for all seven toxics). We find that one more priority 
violation in the past result in an increase in amount fined by 1%. The coefficients for violations 
under non-toxic programs are also positive but rarely statistically significant. General regulatory 
presence captured by higher toxic inspections on others in the same municipality leads to a higher 
fined amount by 0.1%.  
Socioeconomic variables are again rarely significant, except for plants located in 
municipalities with higher shares of the population between 6 and 14 that do not attend school 
facing higher fined amounts. While plants in municipalities with higher shares of the population 
over 15 who are illiterate face lower fined amounts.  
We infer that environmental regulation in Mexico is broadly consistent with the 
compliance history of the individual polluter as higher past violations under toxic monitoring 
programs result in a higher probability of current inspections, fines, and fined amount. Higher past 
violations detected under all other inspection programs result in a higher probability of inspections 
only. Enforcement actions such as fines and the amount fined depend on its degree of severity or 
the extent of violation under the specific monitoring program. Priority violations under all other 
programs are primarily instruments for targeting by regulators. Regarding general regulatory 
measures, an increased number of toxic inspections on other facilities in the same municipality 
results in a higher probability of current inspections, fines, and amount fined. We infer that greater 
regulatory resources imply increased activities on the plant itself. 
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Table 4. Amount Fined Models 
Panel A: Tobit Amount Fined, Marginal effects at mean values, regulatory actions lagged three years 
DEP.VAR: 
Log Amount Fined: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections -0.380 -0.211 -0.221 -0.465 -0.077 -0.153 -0.598 
 (0.639) (0.654) (0.710) (0.673) (0.608) (0.634) (0.676) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.680 -0.630 -0.856 -1.263 0.400 -0.512 -0.271 
 (0.806) (0.797) (0.854) (0.832) (0.737) (0.814) (0.816) 
Toxic Violations 0.824*** 0.712** 0.760** 0.925*** 0.659** 0.816*** 0.919*** 
 (0.305) (0.305) (0.333) (0.316) (0.291) (0.307) (0.318) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.723 0.772 0.956* 0.934* 0.333 0.484 0.600 
 (0.486) (0.476) (0.506) (0.491) (0.456) (0.489) (0.502) 
Toxic Inspections  0.087*** 0.074*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.070*** 0.088*** 0.081*** 
on others (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) 
Toxic Fines 0.387 0.428* 0.372 0.378 0.351 0.227 0.454* 
 (0.236) (0.231) (0.258) (0.237) (0.216) (0.230) (0.244) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.255 0.171 0.105 0.256 0.0572 0.327 0.0791 
 (0.240) (0.240) (0.260) (0.241) (0.225) (0.233) (0.246) 
Toxic Fines  0.097 0.184* 0.068 0.046 0.139 0.090 0.100 
on others (0.108) (0.107) (0.115) (0.111) (0.0993) (0.110) (0.107) 
        
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
Panel B: Tobit Amount Fined, Marginal effects at mean values, regulatory actions lagged two years 
        
DEP.VAR: 
Log Amount Fined: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections 0.244 0.192 -0.002 0.451 -0.0253 0.259 -0.150 
 (0.768) (0.803) (0.874) (0.789) (0.737) (0.752) (0.835) 
Non-toxic Insp. 0.277 -0.0759 0.0622 -0.548 0.964 0.299 0.325 
 (0.915) (0.966) (1.052) (0.954) (0.889) (0.920) (0.989) 
Toxic Violations 0.724** 0.751** 0.853** 0.784** 0.784** 0.804** 0.978** 
 (0.350) (0.377) (0.408) (0.358) (0.346) (0.343) (0.388) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.512 0.826 0.860 0.731 0.448 0.456 0.526 
 (0.554) (0.582) (0.633) (0.557) (0.548) (0.557) (0.611) 
Toxic Inspections  0.118*** 0.083*** 0.107*** 0.116*** 0.075*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 
on others (0.029) (0.031) (0.036) (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) 
Toxic Fines 0.334 0.449* 0.265 0.253 0.409* 0.156 0.371 
 (0.261) (0.251) (0.294) (0.259) (0.237) (0.253) (0.274) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.332 0.191 0.0826 0.376 0.010 0.376 0.167 
 (0.266) (0.263) (0.294) (0.266) (0.250) (0.258) (0.272) 
Toxic Fines  0.334 0.449* 0.265 0.253 0.409* 0.156 0.371 
on others (0.261) (0.251) (0.294) (0.259) (0.237) (0.253) (0.274) 
        
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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4B. Environmental Deterrence of Monitoring and Enforcement  
In this section, we investigate whether regulatory actions, as captured by PROFEPA monitoring 
and enforcement activities like fines imposed, have any environmental deterrence impact. We test 
the impact of monetary sanctions and inspections conducted on itself and others in the same 
municipality on self-reported toxic pollution levels. We know that high levels of self-reported toxic 
emissions do not result in inspections and enforcement actions.11 Polluters do not have the typical 
incentives to under-report pollution based on expected penalties of non-compliance with maximum 
allowable limits on toxic pollutants discharged.  
 Equation (2) below presents the panel data model of toxic releases. Each of the seven toxic 
substances released into the water is estimated separately. For facility i in year t, we regress the 
log of toxic pollutants discharged into the water on past monitoring and enforcement actions on 
itself and others in the same municipality as the plant, controlling other factors that influence 
pollution levels. In equation (2), 𝑅𝑖𝑡′ includes the total number of inspections conducted on itself, 
total number of violations as an outcome of inspections on itself, the log of the sum of monetary 
fines imposed on the plant; 𝑅−𝑖𝑡′ includes the total number of inspections conducted on others in 
the same municipality and the log of the total amount fined on others in the same municipality. 
Like the inspections and fined models, we consider two lag lengths of past three- and two-years’ 
averages for the variables capturing regulatory activities. Plant fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 capture all time-
invariant plant-specific (e.g., size, age, type of industrial facility) and location-specific factors 
(e.g., political jurisdiction, state, distance to large metropolitan cities). Lagged socioeconomic 
 
11
 Results not presented in the paper show that upon including past pollution in the inspections models, the 
coefficients are negative but not statistically significant from zero for all seven toxic substances. In the fined models, 
the coefficients on past pollution is negative across all different specifications (significant only for arsenic and 
mercury). In other words, higher pollution levels reported is linked to lower inspections and fines imposed on the 
plant. 
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variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 capture any differences in plant-level pollution based on community characteristics. 
Year fixed effects control for annual changes in toxic releases not specific to a plant. The error 
term is clustered within states to account for arbitrary correlations across facilities in the same 
state.  𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑜𝑥)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Β𝑅𝑖𝑡′ + Γ𝑅−𝑖𝑡′ +ΦX𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          
           (2) 
Table 5 Panel A presents the within-group panel analyses for the lagged inspections and 
fined values over the past three years. Panel B presents the within-group results with the lagged 
inspections and fined values for the past two years. Overall, we find that regulator reputation 
effects captured by increasing amounts fined on all other major polluters in the same municipality 
exert a significant environmental deterrence effect on toxic discharges of four out of the seven 
pollutants (for the remaining three toxic pollutants, results are negative but not always significant). 
The coefficients in Panel A of Table 5 show that a 1% increase in amount fined in the past three 
years on other facilities in the same municipality results in a decline in chromium and lead 
discharges by 0.07% per year, cadmium discharges by 0.06% per year, and cyanide discharges by 
0.05% per year. For the past two years, the coefficient on lagged fined amount on others is 
consistently negative and significant for four out of the seven toxic pollutants. Estimated 
coefficients show that a 1% increase in the amount fined in the past two years on others results in 
a decline in chromium discharges by 0.09%, cadmium discharges by 0.07% per year, lead 
discharges by 0.06% per year, and cyanide discharges by 0.05% per year. Though the coefficients 
are small in magnitude, these changes might be significant as toxic substances are damaging even 
at minimal concentrations. 
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Among the other regulatory variables, only recent regulatory activities seem to exert any 
statistically significant impact on pollution levels. The total number of past two years violations 
under toxic programs increase reported pollution that is statistically significant for three out of the 
seven toxic pollutants. Results show that one more priority violation under the toxic program leads 
to an increase in annual cadmium discharges by 0.20%, cyanide discharges by 0.15%, and nickel 
discharges by 0.17%. However, the magnitude is even smaller and switch sign for arsenic and 
mercury. The total number of past two years violations under all other programs also increase the 
reported pollution level that is statistically significant for five out of the seven toxic pollutants. 
Results show that one more priority violation under other programs lead to plants increasing their 
cadmium discharges by 0.63% per year, chromium discharges by 0.54% per year, nickel 
discharges by 0.45% per year, cyanide discharges by 0.43% per year, and lead discharges by 0.40% 
per year.  
We infer that violations as an outcome of inspections conducted on the plant under either 
toxic or other monitoring programs not only lead to a higher frequency of pollution reporting 
(missing results in the Appendix Table 6); they also result in higher pollution levels reported. Since 
the monitoring programs in Mexico do not enforce whether plants discharge below a certain level 
of pollutants (e.g., plant-specific effluent limits), the main goal is to promote self-reporting 
protocols undertaken by all major toxic polluters. We infer that significant violations detected at a 
plant result in better environmental management practices such as regular reporting and accurate 
measurements on-site or at licensed laboratories.12  
 
 
 
 
12 Lagged socioeconomic variables (not presented in the table) are rarely significant in the pollution models. 
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Table 5. Environmental Pollution, Panel Data Models 
Panel A: Panel regressions, facility by year data, regulatory actions lagged three years 
DEP.VAR:  
The log of: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections -0.180 -0.192 -0.056 -0.202 -0.240 -0.259 -0.243 
 (0.270) (0.277) (0.284) (0.294) (0.224) (0.279) (0.243) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.068 -0.043 -0.099 0.051 -0.110 0.017 0.146 
 (0.257) (0.311) (0.333) (0.317) (0.230) (0.309) (0.306) 
Toxic Violations -0.002 0.121 0.046 0.142 0.106 0.096 0.060 
 (0.098) (0.122) (0.112) (0.119) (0.092) (0.112) (0.113) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.089 0.225 0.200 0.166 0.198 0.137 0.093 
 (0.177) (0.186) (0.197) (0.267) (0.138) (0.213) (0.207) 
Toxic Inspections  0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
on others (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Toxic Fines 0.127 0.020 -0.018 -0.059 0.022 0.058 0.121 
 (0.110) (0.103) (0.101) (0.135) (0.095) (0.116) (0.110) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.101 -0.139 -0.172* -0.108 -0.151 -0.097 -0.236 
 (0.100) (0.110) (0.097) (0.162) (0.128) (0.122) (0.144) 
Toxic Fines  -0.019 -0.062* -0.073** -0.051* -0.073** -0.020 -0.033 
on others (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) 
        
R2 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
Panel B: Panel regressions, facility by year data, regulatory actions lagged two years 
        
DEP.VAR:  
The log of: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections -0.263 -0.392 -0.327 -0.458* -0.318 -0.193 -0.560*** 
 (0.275) (0.255) (0.259) (0.268) (0.214) (0.232) (0.186) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.212 -0.664** -0.599* -0.229 -0.268 0.050 -0.314 
 (0.219) (0.288) (0.296) (0.231) (0.275) (0.269) (0.355) 
Toxic Violations -0.007 0.202** 0.118 0.150** 0.082 -0.009 0.169** 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.083) (0.072) (0.069) (0.084) (0.083) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.230 0.632*** 0.539*** 0.433** 0.376** 0.227 0.451* 
 (0.138) (0.162) (0.183) (0.171) (0.182) (0.142) (0.227) 
Toxic Inspections  0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 -0.004 
on others (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Toxic Fines 0.117 -0.009 0.032 0.035 0.044 0.086 0.125 
 (0.096) (0.108) (0.103) (0.101) (0.084) (0.095) (0.112) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.021 -0.141 -0.145 -0.136 -0.188 -0.127 -0.238 
 (0.091) (0.127) (0.123) (0.168) (0.152) (0.139) (0.156) 
Toxic Fines  -0.025 -0.067** -0.085*** -0.050* -0.060** -0.008 -0.041 
on others (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) 
        
R2 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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As a robustness check, we estimate an alternate specification, with state-by-year 
interactions, 𝑦𝑠𝑡 in equation (3) below. In these models, we control time-varying state-specific 
factors such as changes in state budgets, variations in overall regulatory stringency, environmental 
attitudes within states, or state-level changes in the economy. The deterrence impact of general 
fines imposed on other facilities is robust to controlling for all time-varying changes or trends 
within states (as seen in Table 6). Similarly, recent past violations over the last two years under 
toxic and non-toxic programs increase pollution levels; past inspections under toxic and non-toxic 
programs lead to a decline in pollution levels (significant for only two pollutants). 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑜𝑥)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + Β𝑅𝑖𝑡′ + Γ𝑅−𝑖𝑡′ +ΦX𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
          (3) 
To summarize, our strongest evidence is that of the environmental deterrence impact 
arising due to the regulator reputation effects captured by increased fined amounts imposed on all 
other plants in the same municipality. We know that a higher number of priority violations at a 
plant leads to a higher probability of fines and amounts fined. Hence, higher fined amounts 
imposed on all plants in the same municipality means that more plants in the municipality are not 
complying with their reporting protocols such as regular measurements or taking samples and 
sending to authorized labs. The plant itself, in response to an increase in expected costs of non-
compliance, engage in activities to improve environmental compliance. In case the plant itself is 
in violation, that leads to increased efforts to meet PROFEPA reporting guidelines and 
requirements through an increase in reported pollution levels.   
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Table 6. Environmental Pollution Models (including state-by-year interactions) 
Panel A: Panel regressions, facility by year data, regulatory actions lagged three years 
DEP.VAR:  
The log of: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections -0.210 -0.335 -0.090 -0.296 -0.297 -0.331 -0.313 
 (0.272) (0.304) (0.308) (0.313) (0.261) (0.284) (0.249) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.146 -0.279 -0.245 -0.110 -0.250 -0.048 -0.024 
 (0.273) (0.343) (0.349) (0.305) (0.262) (0.330) (0.310) 
Toxic Violations 0.063 0.191 0.081 0.205 0.153 0.136 0.087 
 (0.090) (0.132) (0.114) (0.121) (0.095) (0.110) (0.112) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.136 0.343* 0.293 0.227 0.288* 0.178 0.219 
 (0.172) (0.174) (0.197) (0.258) (0.143) (0.213) (0.195) 
Toxic Inspections  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
on others (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Toxic Fines 0.063 0.023 -0.044 -0.073 0.006 0.047 0.129 
 (0.115) (0.106) (0.104) (0.135) (0.100) (0.117) (0.117) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.117 -0.141 -0.133 -0.107 -0.119 -0.099 -0.234 
 (0.103) (0.123) (0.108) (0.165) (0.139) (0.129) (0.156) 
Toxic Fines  -0.043 -0.062 -0.088** -0.060** -0.063* -0.035 -0.053 
on others (0.029) (0.041) (0.033) (0.025) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034) 
        
R2 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
Panel B: Panel regressions, facility by year data, regulatory actions lagged two years 
        
DEP.VAR:  
The log of: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
Toxic Inspections -0.237 -0.477 -0.280 -0.462 -0.281 -0.168 -0.586*** 
 (0.291) (0.305) (0.309) (0.293) (0.260) (0.255) (0.207) 
Non-toxic Insp. -0.377 -0.930*** -0.893*** -0.404* -0.338 -0.019 -0.488 
 (0.256) (0.291) (0.301) (0.236) (0.300) (0.290) (0.380) 
Toxic Violations 0.048 0.264*** 0.135 0.189** 0.086 -0.000 0.180* 
 (0.083) (0.091) (0.080) (0.072) (0.075) (0.087) (0.093) 
Non-toxic Viol. 0.307** 0.718*** 0.654*** 0.455** 0.397** 0.236 0.533** 
 (0.146) (0.156) (0.183) (0.169) (0.187) (0.154) (0.241) 
Toxic Inspections  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 
on others (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
Toxic Fines 0.044 -0.030 -0.004 0.014 0.024 0.063 0.127 
 (0.093) (0.114) (0.110) (0.108) (0.090) (0.100) (0.121) 
Non-toxic Fines 0.063 -0.113 -0.082 -0.099 -0.144 -0.098 -0.219 
 (0.090) (0.137) (0.132) (0.175) (0.161) (0.141) (0.168) 
Toxic Fines  -0.055** -0.077** -0.102*** -0.060** -0.051* -0.014 -0.062** 
on others (0.026) (0.036) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.029) 
        
R2 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we highlight specific mechanisms through which environmental regulation in 
Mexico is effective despite being limited in scope and function. We find positive evidence on cost-
efficiency in targeting polluters with a prior history of significant non-compliance.  If a plant had 
one more violation under toxic inspection, its chance of inspections rises by 1%. We identify 
additional synergies of specific targeting by utilizing outcomes from all other inspection programs 
on the plant. One more violation under all other programs increases its probability of toxic 
inspections by 1-2%.  
We find positive evidence of fines imposed for severe violations under the toxic inspection 
program. One more past violation under toxic inspections raises the probability of being fined by 
3-4%. The amount fined on the plant is also proportional to the severity of non-compliance under 
the toxic inspection program. One more priority violation for toxic inspections on itself results in 
an increase in the amount fined by 1%.  
We find positive evidence of increased monitoring activities in the same jurisdiction 
leading to increased activities directed against the individual plant. One more inspection visit on 
all other plants in the same municipality results in a higher probability of inspections for the plant 
itself by 0.1%. Higher inspections on others also result in a higher probability of being fined by 
less than 0.1% and a higher fined amount on the plant itself by 0.1%. The underlying mechanism 
is that higher regulatory activities, in general, imply increased monitoring of the plant itself, 
leading to the detection of potential reporting protocol failures and an increase in the amount fined. 
We find weak evidence of regulators targeting plants located in poorer or marginalized 
communities. The proportion of the population between 6 and 14 years old that do not attend 
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school and the proportion of households without washing machines are linked to increased 
inspections for three to five pollutants depending on the time lag on regulatory variables. 
We find positive evidence of the effectiveness of recent enforcement actions because past 
violations detected as an outcome of inspection visits lead to an increase in self-reported pollution 
levels. One more priority violation under the toxic program leads to increased self-reported 
discharges by almost 0.20% (statistically significant for three pollutants). Plants are subject to 
multiple inspection programs simultaneously that might explain the larger magnitude of violations 
under other programs leading to an increase in self-reported discharges by around 0.2-0.6%. We 
conclude that traditional regulatory pressure effectively improves self-reporting practices by 
detecting violations in protocols and more accurate or up-to-date measurements. 
Last, we find evidence on the deterrence effect of general regulator reputation. Results 
show that a 1% increase in amount fined on other facilities in the same municipality results in a 
reduction in annual chromium discharges by 0.07-0.10%, cadmium discharges by 0.06-0.08%, 
lead discharges by 0.05-0.07%, and cyanide discharges by 0.05-0.06%. For the remaining three 
toxics, the coefficient on lagged fined amount on others is consistently negative but not always 
significant at conventional levels (nickel 0.03-0.06%, arsenic 0.02-0.06%, and mercury 0.01-
0.04%). Shimshack and Ward (2005) find evidence on significant regulator reputation effects in 
the US. Preliminary findings from developing countries show that general deterrence effects like 
more visible enforcement actions of plant closures affect plant-level pollution than specific 
deterrence effects (Caffera and Lagomarsino 2014). In Mexico, the imposition of fines by 
PROFEPA is widely publicized in the news media, as cited in the introduction. 
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APPENDIX: 
 
1. Data Appendix 
2. Regular and Verification Inspections Appendix 
3. Missing Pollution Reports Appendix
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1. Data Appendix 
In this Appendix, we describe regulatory activities in more detail. Appendix Figure 1 presents the 
statewide distribution of regulatory activities of toxic inspections, fines, and log of amount fined 
in real USD. We observe that inspections and fines were higher in Tamaulipas (Northeast industrial 
corridor), Queretaro, Distrito Federal (Mexico City), Nuevo Leon, and Jalisco (the last three states 
include the largest metropolitan cities of Mexico). The second panel shows that the log of amount 
fined under toxic inspections was highest in Tamaulipas, Queretaro, Jalisco, State of Mexico 
(Mexico in the bar chart), and Distrito Federal (Mexico City).  
 
Appendix Figure 1. Distribution of the total number of toxic inspections, fines imposed, and log 
of amount fined by states, 2004-2015. 
 
Appendix Figure 2 presents trends in the annual data for the total number of toxic 
inspections, fines imposed, and log of amount fined. From 2004 to 2015, all three indicators of 
regulatory activities exhibit a declining trend with a peak in inspections in 2010. The second panel 
shows that the log of amount fined declined from 2004 to 2015, with some increase in fines in 
2009-2010.  
2 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2. Trends in the total number of toxic inspections, fines imposed, and log of 
amount fined, over 2004-2015. 
 
Appendix Figure 3 presents the statewide distribution of regulatory activities under non-toxic (all 
other programs) inspections, fines, and log of amount fined in real USD. The total count of 
inspections and fines was highest in Distrito Federal (Mexico City), Nuevo Leon, Queretaro, 
Jalisco, and State of Mexico (Mexico in the bar chart). The second panel shows that the log of 
amount fined under all other (non-toxic) inspections was highest in Distrito Federal (Mexico City), 
State of Mexico (Mexico in the bar chart), Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, and Queretaro.  
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Appendix Figure 3. Distribution of the total number of non-toxic inspections, fines imposed, and 
log of amount fined by states, 2004-2015. 
 
Appendix Figure 4 presents trends in the annual data for the total number of non-toxic 
inspections, fines imposed, and log of amount fined. The total number of non-toxic inspections 
was on a slight upward trend. The total number of fines imposed under non-toxic programs and 
the sum of logged amount fined (second panel) do not exhibit a significant trend from 2004. 
 
Appendix Figure 4. Trends in the total number of non-toxic inspections, fines imposed, and log 
of amount fined, over 2004-2015. 
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Appendix Table 1 presents summary statistics on all non-toxic programs. A plant got 
inspected 0.05 times annually under all non-toxic inspection programs. On average, a plant faced 
a financial penalty only 0.01 times in a year under all non-toxic inspection programs. Of the 
positive fined amounts, on average, a plant faced a penalty of $256 for positive fines under all 
other non-toxic programs. In the past three (two) years, a plant was likely to be inspected 0.13 
(0.09) times and fined 0.05 (0.03) times with an average fine of $274 ($268) for positive fines. In 
the past three (two) years, inspections, fines and amount fined faced by other plants in the same 
municipality was 9.58 (3.91) times, 4.45 (1.67) times, and average fined amount of $699 ($586) 
for positive fines. 
Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics on non-toxic regulatory activities 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max. 
INSPECTIONS, NON-TOXICS     
Annual inspections on itself (#) 11,860 0.05 0.21 1.00 
Past 3 yr. inspections on itself (#) 11,860 0.13 0.42 3.00 
Past 3 yr. inspections on others (#) 11,860 9.58 30.06 171.00 
Past 2 yr. inspections on itself (#) 11,860 0.09 0.32 2.00 
Past 2 yr. inspections on others (#) 11,860 3.91 13.53 90.00 
FINES IMPOSED, NON-TOXICS     
Annual fines on itself (#) 11,860 0.01 0.12 1.00 
Past 3 yr. fines on itself (#) 11,860 0.05 0.23 3.00 
Past 3 yr. fines on others (#) 11,860 4.45 15.33 88.00 
Past 2 yr. fines on itself (#) 11,860 0.03 0.19 2.00 
Past 2 yr. fines on others (#) 11,860 1.67 6.72 45.00 
AMOUNT FINED, NON-TOXICS     
Annual fines on itself (2010 USD) 11,860 3.91 248.32 22789.46 
Annual fines on itself, given fines>0 181 256.11 1999.41 22789.46 
Past 3 yr. fines on itself (2010 USD) 11,860 10.41 393.88 22789.46 
Past 3 yr. fines on itself, given fines>0 451 273.63 2004.07 22789.46 
Past 3 yr. fines on others (2010 USD) 11,860 269.90 2208.05 28294.75 
Past 3 yr. fines on others, given fines>0 4,579 699.07 3511.35 28294.75 
Past 2 yr. fines on itself (2010 USD) 11,860 7.61 332.53 22789.46 
Past 2 yr. fines on itself, given fines>0 337 267.80 1957.76 22789.46 
Past 2 yr. fines on others (2010 USD) 11,860 190.22 1837.13 23188.77 
Past 2 yr. fines on others, given fines>0 3,850 585.97 3188.54 23188.77 
NOTES: The summary statistics are for 3,432 facilities across Mexico.  
  
5 
 
2. Regular and Verification Inspections Appendix 
 
In this section, we differentiate between regular and verification inspections by estimating 
separate models. The primary objective is to identify whether regular visits have distinct 
determinants from verification visits. For example, if initial visits, part of regular monitoring 
protocol, is higher for plants that belong to high-risk, environmental impacts or toxics residuals 
industrial sectors, and verification visits depend on the outcome of the initial inspection visit.  
Overall, for initial visits, we find evidence of targeting based on the type of manufacturing 
facility as regular inspections conducted on the plant during the past three (two) years are 
significant determinants of inspections (Appendix Table 2 and Appendix Table 3). The shorter 
time lag of the past two years is significant in predicting current inspections for the toxic program 
(2 percentage points). However, for both time lags, past inspections under all other non-toxic 
programs significantly determine current toxic inspections by almost three percentage points 
(significant for all seven toxics). If the plant had verification visits under either toxic and all other 
inspections programs, it was likely to be targeted for regular inspections (between 2 and 3 
percentage points). Complaints by citizens and emergencies (denoted by comp. in the tables) filed 
in the past two years lead to higher current inspections between 1 and 4 percentage points 
(significant for cyanide, lead, and mercury). Higher toxic inspections on all other plants in the 
same municipality and higher fined amounts under toxic inspection programs on all other plants 
in the same municipality lead to a higher likelihood of current inspections. Coefficients are 
statistically significant for the past two years measures. Past violations (and higher fined amount 
on itself for past three years lag) is negative; that is counterintuitive. However, results presented 
in Appendix Table 4 and Appendix Table 5 show that priority violations for both toxic and non-
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toxic programs (and higher fined amounts for the past three years lag) are significant determinants 
of verification visits. 
The coefficients on socioeconomic variables are rarely significant. For initial visits, we 
find that polluters located in denser municipalities are visited less due to limited regulatory 
resources to conduct monitoring activities of high concentration of manufacturing and might be 
related to local factors such as a larger agglomeration of industries implying fewer regular visits 
of major polluting plants. The other two socioeconomic status variables (proportion of the 
population between 6 and 14 years old that do not attend school and proportion of households 
without a washing machine) maintain sign and significance with plants located in municipalities 
with higher shares inspected more. 
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Appendix Table 2. Regular Inspection Models (lagged values over the past three years) 
Panel A: RE Probit Regular Inspections, Marginal effects at mean values, lagged values over the past three years 
DEP.VAR: 
Regular 
inspections: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
reg. tox insp. 0.023* 0.024* 0.023 0.014 0.020 0.022 0.019 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
reg. n-tox insp. 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
comp. tox insp. 0.025* 0.0086 0.002 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.021) 
comp. n-tox  0.016 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.003 0.011 
insp. (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
ver. tox insp. 0.021*** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016** 0.013 0.019** 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
ver. n-tox insp. 0.024*** 0.025** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.018* 0.017** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
past tox viol. -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
past n-tox viol. -0.007** -0.007* -0.008* -0.010** -0.007** -0.004 -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
reg. tox insp. 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ver. tox insp. -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
comp. tox insp. 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 
others (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
past tox fines -0.002 -0.005* -0.004 -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
past n-tox fines -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
past tox fines  0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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Appendix Table 3. Regular Inspection Models (lagged values over the past two years) 
Panel A: RE Probit Regular Inspections, Marginal effects at mean values, lagged values over the past two years 
DEP.VAR: 
Regular 
inspections: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
reg. tox insp. 0.026* 0.027** 0.026* 0.021 0.019 0.026* 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
reg. n-tox insp. 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.015** 0.019** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
comp. tox insp. 0.033 0.014 0.003 0.043** 0.028* 0.033* 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) 
comp. n-tox  0.018 0.023 0.022 0.014 0.022 0.013 0.006 
insp. (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
ver. tox insp. 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.021** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
ver. n-tox insp. 0.021** 0.032*** 0.027** 0.020* 0.030*** 0.016 0.015 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
past tox viol. -0.012** -0.007 -0.009 -0.013*** -0.007 -0.013** -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
past n-tox viol. -0.006 -0.008* -0.007 -0.008* -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
reg. tox insp. 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.001* 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ver. tox insp. -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
comp. tox insp. 0.001 0.004* 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002 
others (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
past tox fines 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
past n-tox fines 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
past tox fines  0.002* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 
others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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Appendix Table 4. Verification Inspection Models (lagged values over the past three years) 
Panel A: Verification Inspections, Marginal effects at mean values, lagged values over the past three years 
DEP.VAR: 
Verification 
inspections: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
reg. tox insp. -0.006 -0.008* -0.007* -0.005 -0.005* -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
reg. n-tox insp. -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
comp. tox insp. -0.006 -0.006 -0.009* -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
comp. n-tox  -0.003 -0.002 0.008 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 
insp. (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
ver. tox insp. -0.009** -0.010* -0.011* -0.010* -0.010* -0.008* -0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
ver. n-tox insp. -0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.005* -0.004 -0.007** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
past tox viol. 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
past n-tox viol. 0.003 0.003* -0.000 0.003* 0.003** 0.004** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
reg. tox insp. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ver. tox insp. -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
comp. tox insp. 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
past tox fines 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
past n-tox fines 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
past tox fines  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.000 
others (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
        
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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Appendix Table 5. Verification Inspection Models (lagged values over the past two years) 
Panel A: Verification Inspections, Marginal effects at mean values, lagged values over the past two years 
DEP.VAR: 
Verification 
inspections: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
reg. tox insp. -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
reg. n-tox insp. -0.005 -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
comp. tox insp. -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
comp. n-tox  -0.007 -0.005 0.006 -0.003 -0.000 -0.009 -0.002 
insp. (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
ver. tox insp. -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
ver. n-tox insp. -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007* -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
past tox viol. 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
past n-tox viol. 0.004** 0.005** 0.002 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
reg. tox insp. -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ver. tox insp. 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001* 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
comp. tox insp. 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002* 
others (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
past tox fines 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
past n-tox fines 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
past tox fines  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.000 
others 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Obs. 8,681 8,074 8,312 8,684 9,037 8,232 9,279 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
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3. Missing Pollution Reports Appendix 
 
In this Appendix, we address the unbalanced nature of the annual pollution data. We cannot 
confirm whether plants that do not report certain pollutants in some years are due to no discharge 
into water, or zero or below detectable standard for measurement equipment or intentional missing 
reports (due to no measurement). In Appendix Table 6, we predict the probability of missing 
reports based on the same explanatory variables as in the main pollution model. We find that 
increased number of past violations under toxic and non-toxic monitoring programs lead to a lower 
probability of missing reports for all seven pollutants. Increased fined amount in the past (on itself) 
under toxic program leads to a lower probability of missing reports for five out of the seven 
pollutants for the two years lagged measures (four out of the seven pollutants for the three years 
lagged measures). We infer that priority violations under toxic or all other monitoring programs 
and fines imposed under toxic inspections promote annual reporting, which means that specific 
enforcement actions effectively improve pollution measurement protocols at the plant. However, 
past inspection visits that do not result in serious violations has the opposite effect of increasing 
the probability of missing reports for six out of the seven pollutants for the two years lagged 
measures(three out of the seven pollutants for the three years lagged measures) which reflects 
limited inspector resources to visit all major plants each year. For the results focusing on non-
missing pollution reports, no systematic bias arises as the monitoring and enforcement programs 
do not provide plants with under-reporting incentives.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Appendix Table 6. Pollution Report Missing Models 
Panel A: RE Probit, Marginal effects at mean values, lagged values over the past three years 
DEP.VAR: 
Report 
Missing: 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
        
past tox insp. 0.022 0.033** 0.032** 0.020 0.027** 0.025 0.018 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
past n-tox  -0.013 0.012 0.030* -0.009 0.016 0.006 0.012 
insp. (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) 
past tox viol. -0.014* -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.013* -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.016** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
past n-tox  -0.024** -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.024** -0.032*** -0.028** -0.029*** 
viol. (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
past tox insp.  -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
past tox fines -0.0101* -0.009* -0.007 -0.010* -0.009* -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
past n-tox  -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.010* -0.006 -0.011* -0.007 
fines (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
past tox fines  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
others (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Obs. 29,616 34,016 34,232 29,676 36,056 29,176 36,056 
Panel B: RE Probit, Marginal effects at mean values, lagged values over the past two years 
DEP.VAR: 
Report 
Missing: 
 
As^ Cd Cr CN-^ Pb Hg^ Ni 
past tox insp. 0.044** 0.034** 0.027* 0.041** 0.029* 0.037** 0.015 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
past n-tox  -0.011 0.014 0.031* -0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.014 
insp. (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
past tox viol. -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
past n-tox  -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.045*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.030** -0.033*** 
viol. (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.01) (0.013) (0.012) 
past tox insp.  -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
others (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
past tox fines -0.014** -0.011** -0.008 -0.016** -0.013** -0.015** -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
past n-tox  0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
fines (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
past tox fines  -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
others (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Obs. 29,616 34,016 34,232 29,676 36,056 29,176 36,056 
NOTES: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ^ denotes 
results do not include the years 2014 and 2015 for arsenic, cyanide, and mercury. 
 
